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ABSTRACT 
ALEXANDER MICHAEL SEUFERT: Stratēgoi and the Administration of Greece under the 
Antigonids. 
(Under the direction of Fred Naiden) 
 
 This thesis investigates the policies of the Antigonid Dynasty towards the poleis of its 
kingdom by examining the highest military office of the kingdom, the stratēgos. This work 
takes special care to mark the civic responsibilities of the office from the time of Antigonus 
Gonatas to the eventual conquest by Rome in order to elucidate the manner in which the 
Macedonians oversaw the difficult task of establishing and maintaining control over their 
subject cities. The thesis aims to show that the Antigonid kings sought to create a delicate 
balance between their own interests and the interests of the populace. In doing so, they were 
keen to take traditional sensibilities into account when governing over the poleis. Contrary to 
previous scholarship, this thesis shows that the Antigonids allowed local elections of military 
positions to take place, and did not suppress existing magistracies within subject cities. 
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Introduction: the Problem of Antigonid Administration 
 
The issue of Antigonid administration following the establishment of the kingdom in 
the early fourth century has been largely relegated to arguments regarding the level of 
interaction between the royal officials of Macedon and the individual poleis of Greece. 
Scholarship concerning the organizational structure under the Antigonids has long held that 
the epistatai were appointed as royal supervisory officials within the cities of Macedonia 
proper, while regional stratēgoi oversaw the newly acquired areas in the north and south.1 In 
1996, however, the work of Miltiades Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions under the 
Kings, fundamentally changed the study of Macedonian administration. A work that was over 
a decade in the making, Institutions has provided scholars with a plethora of inscriptions 
related to the offices of Antigonid Greece and brought a new understanding to the structure 
of the kingdom. In this regard, it is the most comprehensive study of Macedonian 
institutions. On top of dozens of other similar publications by Hatzopoulos and others, the 
work has allowed for a reevaluation of previous notions regarding third-century Greece under 
the Antigonid kings. In light of this new material, research into the Macedonian state has 
taken on new impetus. Since its publication, however, there has not been a thorough and 
comprehensive look at Antigonid stratēgoi and the role of high military command within the 
administration of Antigonid Greece. My work attempts to analyze new information that has 
                                                          
1
 Holleaux 1897 believed that the Antigonids divided Greece into several regions, called stratēgia, over which a 
stratēgos ruled (p. 446). Similarly, Bengtson 1944 believed that stratēgoi were responsible for die Nebenlande 
(1944, pp. 317-30, 323-24); Beloch 1912 believed they were in neighboring regions as well: p. 1, 104; cf. Tarn 
1969, pp. 194-96. 
  2 
emerged regarding Antigonid organization, looking both at the old notions of regional 
government and the new evidence concerning the role of local institutions in the organization 
of the kingdom. 
To date, Hermann Bengtson’s Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit (1944) is the 
only work to deal exclusively with the question of the stratēgos as an administrator of the 
Diadochic states. Though this study is a detailed and complete analysis of this office in the 
Hellenistic period, the book is now most certainly out of date. Bengtson believed that the 
Antigonid structure was based on a regional model in which the neighboring provinces of 
Macedonia proper were under the control of a stratēgos at the head with several subordinate 
officials beneath him. While more recent scholarship has tended to focus on the role of local 
supervisory officials (  istatēs) within the poleis of the kingdom, little effort has been given 
to the regional organization of the kingdom.
2
 In particular, the administration of southern 
Greece has not received a comprehensive examination in some time. Given the plethora of 
recently published inscriptions regarding the institutions of Macedonian Greece, a 
reevaluation of the literary evidence in light of the new epigraphical finds will help to more 
fruitfully assess the nature of the Antigonid king’s relationship with the numerous poleis 
under his domain. Specifically, my study examines the use of military appointments in order 
to determine the policy of the Macedonians towards their subjugated cities. Contrary to what 
one might expect, the kings seem not have attempted outright military dominance as one 
would initially glean fro  Philip V’s co  ent about the “fetters of Greece.” Instead, 
                                                          
2
 For the   istatēs and administration of cities, see: Hatzopoulos 1996, pp. 371-429; Hammond 1999 and 2000; 
Errington 1999, pp. 229-38. For   istatēs with military command, see: Livy 44.12.2; 44.44.4. For the 
relationship of city and king, see: Errington 2002. 
 
  3 
policies of the Antigonid Kings gradually evolved to show keen awareness of their military 
presence in the city-states of Greece, a point often missed by literary sources. 
After centuries of enjoying freedom and autonomy, the Greek poleis were now forced 
to abide by the will and desire of the Antigonids. For the Macedonian king, maintaining a 
sound relationship with the city-states was of crucial importance since, as the constant 
attempts by the Ptolemaic Kings show, the traditional poleis of Greece could be easily 
excited to rebellion. The traditional call of freedom and autonomy was still vital to the 
psyche and identity that defined them. Along the same lines, military glory was a significant 
means of obtaining honor and distinction that was so highly valued in the Greek world. 
Under the Antigonids, city-states no longer engaged in the constant warfare between 
themselves as they once had. This avenue from which individuals won glory and distinction 
was less viable to the citizens of these conquered cities. Macedonian hegemony not only 
affected the political sovereignty of the polis, but also the means by which individuals 
established themselves in their communities. One would imagine that the military distinction 
that had made the office of stratēgos important for winning renown was now severely 
reduced under the Antigonids. As a result, the office needed to adapt its role and place 
greater emphasis on the civic and local obligations of this official. As I will argue, this 
change was recognized and exploited by the kings as a means of maintaining a policy that 
was at once beneficial to themselves and cognizant of the sensibilities of the local 
community. The stratēgoi remained prominent local statesmen, as Chaniotis claims, only 
now the element of φιλοτιμία πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα was added as a necessary component of an 
honorable individual.
3
 In this sense, the thesis is as much about the social changes behind the 
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 Chaniotis 2005, pp. 31-36. 
  4 
adoption of civic duties by this official and its subsequent effect Antigonid policy as it is a 
contribution to the institutional history of the Macedonian state. 
The acceptance of these city-states to Macedonian domination was no doubt a 
difficult one, as the constant rebellions from 330 to 262 illustrate. After nearly fifty years of 
unsuccessful attempts to hold these poleis, Antigonus Gonatas must have seen that a new 
approach was necessary. With a keen sense of the social importance of military glory, 
Antigonus was the first of the kings to recognize that outright military dominance was not the 
best means of maintaining Macedonian hegemony.
4
 By no sheer coincidence, he was also the 
first to successfully establish long-term, stable control over the Greek city-states. Behind his 
success, as I will argue, was a keen sense of the importance given to local military 
institutions. By looking at the office of stratēgos, a position which perhaps best represents 
this ideal, the administrative goals and policies of the Macedonian Kings will become more 
apparent. The Antigonids were careful to maintain these local institutions as a means of 
sustaining their own objectives with the polis. 
The sources used in this work will consist of a blend of epigraphic and literary 
evidence. Given that there are no extant literary sources from the Macedonians, my work 
gives substantial weight to the information obtained through inscriptions. A distinct 
characteristic throughout the literary sources is their failure to understand the technical 
vocabulary employed by the Macedonian state (a problem seen in Plutarch, Livy, and 
Polybius). I seek to give the best definition for the term stratēgos from a close scrutiny and 
comparison of both epigraphical and literary evidence. 
                                                          
4
 I will argue this point throughout the work. For a treatment of Antigonus’ support of the Greek intellectuals, 
see: Tarn 1969, pp. 223-56; cf. Gabbert 1997 for a recent treatment of Antigonus from the epigraphic 
perspective. 
  5 
My study begins by giving a brief description of the stratēgos under Philip and 
Alexander in order to provide some background to the development of this official and his 
role in the administration of Antigonid Greece. While the system prior to Antigonus Gonatas 
is a different situation altogether and outside of the scope of this work, it is, however, worth 
making a cursory summary of these events so as to give some idea of the general historical 
development of the position of stratēgos. An analysis of the office from 280 to 167 BCE then 
follows, specifically marking the evolution of the position from its solidification under 
Antigonus Gonatas in the early third century to the downfall of the kingdom. The thesis 
consists of three parts: the first examines the stratēgos in the southern regions of Greece, 
with particular focus on Corinth and Athens. The second is an examination of prevailing 
scholarly opinions regarding the stratēgos in Macedonia proper. Finally, there is a brief 
discussion of some outlying evidence of a stratēgos as an independent dynast in Asia Minor 
under the auspices of Philip V. The example illustrates the means in which the Antigonid 
Kings subjugated new territories. The thesis concludes by drawing some deductions about 
the Antigonid kingdom in light of this survey of evidence. In doing so, I hope to show that 
previously held notions about the role of the stratēgos in the Antigonid Kingdom as a royal 
official are, in most instances, misguided and that regional administration played a far less 
significant role in the governance of Antigonid territories than previously believed. 
Moreover, my work provides insight into the appointment of individuals to military 
positions, and shows that emphasis within the Antigonid kingdom was placed on local 
appointments and existing institutions, a notable policy of the kings.
5
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 This has been a rather important issue in recent scholarship, see: Hatzopoulos 1996, pp. 372-96; cf. Hammond 
1999 and 2000; Errington 2002. 
 
   
 
 
 
The Stratēgos from Philip II to the Battle of Ipsus 
 
The title of stratēgos can be seen as fitting into two broad categories: First, it has the 
traditional meaning of the Classical period as an ad hoc military position set for a specific 
task. These were local stratēgoi who acted as statesmen within their respective communities. 
In Athens, for instance, a democratically elected board of ten of these officials was 
responsible for the foreign policy of the city and the general conduct of any military affairs.
6
 
The second meaning is that of the acedonian i perialist odel first used after Philip II’s 
conquest of Greece. Given that the Greeks lacked any vocabulary for regional governors 
(satrap was never fully adopted), the Macedonians used this term for officers who operated in 
a supervisory manner as provincial authorities in territories outside of Macedonia proper. 
This is particularly evident in regions of recent acquisition, where further military 
subjugation was needed more than administrative supervision. While the exact process is 
unknown, the position eventually coupled administrative duties with that of its prior military 
responsibilities and evolved into one of the more prominent offices of the Hellenistic period. 
This second meaning is the subject of the following section. 
Several leading figures of the Diadochic period held the position of stratēgos. The 
first was Memnon, a Macedonian noble appointed by Philip for supervision over the territory 
of Thrace. While little is known about his time there, his position must have been secure 
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 Stockton, pp. 31-2, 105-6. 
 
  7 
enough for him to feel that he was able to challenge Antipater for primacy of Greece, a 
conflict that was eventually settled in 331.
7
 In order to maintain forward progress on his 
campaign, Alexander left stratēgoi behind to integrate regions in need of further military 
subjugation. Thus, there was a flourishing of individuals who possessed this title. Upon 
leaving on his campaign into Persia, Alexander left Antipater in charge of the affairs of 
Greece with the designation stratēgos tēs Europēs, the only specific term given to him in any 
of our sources.
8
 Similarly, Lysimachus was left in Thrace as stratēgos of the region, a 
position he would retain following the negotiations at Babylon and Triparadeisus and even 
up to his death at Corupedion in 281. Following the death of Alexander in 323, several of 
these figures each sought a stake in the newly expanded empire. 
Since none possessed the hereditary legitimacy to obtain the title of basileus, the 
office of stratēgos was the preferred designation for the Diadochoi for nearly two decades. 
None of the inheritors of the kingdom of Alexander possessed the necessary status to assume 
the title of king, especially while the Argead bloodline still survived. The need to find a 
suitable designation to incorporate legitimacy through military power and maintain a 
cautious distance from the institution of basileus prompted several Diadochoi to take or 
retain the title of stratēgos. Unlike that of king or satrap, the office had no intrinsic 
geographic or hereditary limitations. Thus, it was the most adaptable and suitable designation 
for the Diadochoi to take at this time. While geographical qualification could certainly be 
placed on such a position (e.g. stratēgos epi tē  c  ra ), no such restrictions were inherent 
                                                          
7
 Diod. 17.62.5: Μέμνων γὰρ ὁ καθεσταμένος στρατηγὸς τῆς Θρᾴκης. 
 
8
 Diod. 17. 118.1: φασὶ γὰρ Ἀντίπατρον ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης στρατηγὸν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καταλειφθέντα. Diod. 17.17.5: 
οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἀπολελειμμένοι στρατιῶται, ὧν Ἀντίπατρος εἶχε τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. Arr. Anab. 1.11.3: ἅμα 
δὲ τῷ ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ ἐξελαύνει ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλησπόντου τὰ μὲν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἀντιπάτρῳ 
ἐπιτρέψας. 
  8 
with the title. Rather, the designation was a reflection of the expressing one’s ight and right 
to rule through military might. Given the potential uncertainties of one’s right to assu e the 
title basileus, stratēgos was perfectly suited since it expressed one’s authority through the 
only title that encompassed their source of legitimacy, military superiority. 
It took nearly sixteen years after the death of Alexander for the designation of 
basileus to become acceptable to Macedonian sensibilities. Following his victory over the 
Ptolemaic forces at Salamis (Cyprus) in 307, Antigonus Monophthalmus was the first to take 
such a title, and his rivals quickly followed his example.
9
 His assumption of the role of king 
came only after years of holding the position of stratēgos tēs Asias, a designation also held 
by his main opponent, Eumenes.
10
 The implication is that the title indicated powers as fairly 
more substantial than that of a standard satrap, a term which encompassed a limited 
geographical scope. Richard Billows sees this transition, while important to the theoretical 
basis of Antigonus’ power, as so ewhat eaningless in the practical exertion of influence.11 
As he indicates, the Diadochoi acted with full authority over the administration of their 
territories, regardless of title. Whether there was any significant change in theoretical power 
or not, the assumption still holds that the office represented a specific meaning to the royal 
court. It was a matter of assuming a less offensive designation for the sensibilities of the 
Macedonians, who remained vital to Antigonus’ hope of further solidifying the e pire of 
Alexander. The term stratēgos best fit his position at the time due to the military 
connotations that came with such an office. His assumption of the title is perhaps less 
                                                          
9
 Billows, pp. 155-62. 
 
10
 Arr. 1.19.3. 
 
11
 Billows 1990 p. 243: “Antigonos (and, as far as we can tell, the other Diadochoi) acted as ruler and owner of 
his territories with full authority to ad inister the  as he saw fit.” 
  9 
indicative of the overall meaning of the word as a regional commander since he could not 
take the designation of basileus without inflicting serious damage to his reputation with the 
Macedonian nobles, whose support was crucial. Antigonus needed to legitimize his position, 
but in the interim stratēgos represented an adequate middle ground, expressing both his 
independence and authority through military strength. 
Inheriting what was essentially the satrapal system of the Achaemenid Empire, 
Antigonus appointed stratēgoi over the key provincial areas of his new, vast empire. In 317, 
Antigonus created the office of “stratēgos of the upper satrapies” in charge of several 
administrative districts of the former Persian Empire.
12
 Within the territories of the former 
Achaemenid East, the title became synonymous with that of a satrap. Antigonus, however, 
never fully implemented any long-term policy in Greece since constant warring took place 
with Cassander. In some instances, areas of particular strategic value came under the control 
of stratēgoi. Both Cassander and Antipater, for example, had stratēgoi in charge of the 
Peloponnese.
13
 At some point, even Antigonus Gonatas, who was responsible for many of the 
administrative policies of the kingdom, held the position in southern Greece before inheriting 
the title of basileus after the capture and death of his father.
14
 In addition to the inheritors of 
Alexander, the title of stratēgos continued to be used to indicate a position responsible for 
military supervisor over regions in need of further conquest. Gradually, stratēgoi became 
                                                          
12
 I have purposefully avoided a detailed discussion of Antigonus’ Asian territories because it is outside of my 
area of focus. For the administration of the Asian realm of Antigonus and its influence on the later Seleucid 
Empire, see: Billows 1990, pp. 237-85; Bengtson 1964, pp. 96-118. 
 
13
 For the stratēgos of the Peloponnesus under Cassander, see: Diod. 19.63.1; 19.64. For Alexander, an officer 
of Antigonus, and the potential mention of a stratēgia as an administrative district: Diod. 19.66. 
 
14
 Bengston 1964, pp. 345-46. 
  10 
settled in particular areas of sensitive strategic value, in which supervision over the garrisons 
and forts helped to guarantee the successful maintenance of Macedonian dominance.
 
   
 
 
 
Stratēgoi of the Southern Regions 
 
The issue of Antigonid administration in the southern regions of Greece is one that 
has not yet been adequately handled. A growing amount of scholarship has started to tackle 
the issue of Macedonian officials south of Thessaly and the policies behind the 
administration of the poleis in this area.
15
 As yet, however, no single work has examined the 
role of Macedonian military policies with the territories of these formerly independent city-
states. For the Antigonids the task was no easy one since long-held notions of autonomia and 
eleutheria were ever present in the mindset of many of the cities, a factor with which the 
kings had to contend when creating policy. In regards to this, the following section attempts 
to elucidate some of the goals and methods used by the Antigonid kings to maintain their 
hegemony in the southern regions of Greece. Since Corinth and Athens were the primary loci 
of Macedonian administration in this region, this chapter will look primarily at these two 
cities. 
The death of Antigonus Monophthalmus at the Battle of Ipsus in 301 threw Greece 
into a tumultuous state in which several prominent figures claimed supremacy. After the 
battle, undisputed control of Greece fell to Cassander, but he died shortly after in 297, at 
which point Demetrius was able to take over and eliminate the remaining Antipatrids. His 
constant warring, however, caused most regions to remain under continual dispute with his 
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 Errington 2002; cf. Hammond 1999 and 2000. 
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chief rivals, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Lysimachus of Thrace.
16
 As it was, Demetrius only ever 
controlled Macedon itself for six years before his retreat to Asia Minor and eventual capture 
by Seleucus Nicator in 286. Following the death of his father in 283, Antigonus Gonatas took 
control of the kingdom that was ravaged by all three of its rivals when he possessed little 
more than a few scattered coastal fortresses.
17
 As fickle as fortune had been with his father, 
Antigonus benefitted from a series of lucky strokes that eliminated the very contenders who 
had pressed Demetrius so fiercely. First, Lysimachus was killed at the Battle of Corupedion 
in 281, and Thrace was thrown into chaos following the death of Lysimachus and his son, 
Agathocles, two years earlier. The area fell to Ptolemy Ceraunus, Meleager, and eventually 
Antipater (Cassander’s son), with all were equally ineffective against the Celts. During this 
vacuum of power, Sosthenes, who had defended Thrace, was asked to be king by his army 
sometime in 281.
18
 He refused the title of king but retained that of a stratēgos (dux, in Latin), 
and kept the area safe from further deprivations until the Celts moved south. While the 
re ainder of Sosthenes’ life is a ystery, Eusebius claims that he was a king for two years, 
at which point Antigonus finally gained a solid foothold and was declared king in 277, 
following his victory over the Celts at Lysi acheia. Before these events Antigonus’ 
territories largely consisted of the border and sea forts left to him by his father. Antigonus’ 
solidification was by no means secure, however, as Ptolemaeus and then King Pyrrhus 
himself were a thorn in the side of the Macedonian king until their deaths in 272. As 
uncontested king of Macedon, Antigonus could then begin the rigorous task of regaining the 
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 Errington 1990, pp. 142-61. 
 
17
 Errington 1990, pp. 162-67. 
 
18
 Hier. Chron. 1.241; 245 Schöne; Just. Epit. 24.5.12-13; cf. Bengtson 1944, pp. 381-85 and Errington 1990, 
pp. 160, 164. 
  13 
territories lost at the capture and death of his father. Unlike De etrius, however, Antigonus’ 
main concern was not military conquest. Instead, his focus seems to have been on 
establishing a secure and safe kingdom. The administrative system that had been so utterly 
destroyed over the past two decades could begin operating again after a gradual incorporation 
of the mainland sites.
19
 
The elimination of rivals during this period of uncertainty allowed Antigonus to begin 
annexing territories and consolidating his control over mainland Greece, using the coastal 
forts as strongholds. The first attempt to reestablish this system was in southern Greece under 
Antigonus’ half-brother Craterus in charge of the garrison in Corinth. His position was 
perhaps commensurate to that of Antigonus and Pyrrhus, who served a few years earlier in 
Corinth as “stratēgoi for the common security.”20 Given the strategic significance and the 
uncertainties of the region, the control of the citadel of Corinth became the defining method 
of administration for this area, serving as one of the three fetters of Greece. Royal 
administration, however, remained relatively unobtrusive, and Macedonian concern for this 
region seems relegated simply to maintaining military dominance. In the Peloponnesus, the 
defining goal for the king was to hold the citadel of Corinth while allowing favorable 
political forces to remain in power in individual poleis.
21
 Beyond that, the administration of 
the southern regions seems to have been of decidedly little concern, with the main 
prerogative being the garrison. Having himself been the stratēgos in charge of Corinth and 
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 Willia  Tarn’s work on Antigonus Gonatas has the  ost co prehensive examination of his political reforms, 
but is quite dated (1913). For a more a more recent political biography of Antigonus, see: Gabbert 1997. 
 
20
 For the stratēgos in charge of the ‘co  on security’ and the administration of Corinth in the Diadochic 
period, see: Bengtson 1944, p. 165. For the inscription mentioned, see: IG IV² 1, 68. 
 
21
 Poly. 2.41.10; 9.29.6; cf. Errington 1990, pp. 237-38 for a discussion on the king’s concern for the southern 
regions. 
 
  14 
Piraeus, Antigonus understood the strategic significance of these forts, which most likely 
explains the appointment of Craterus to this position in ca. 280. Direct control of the region 
seemed beyond the scope or desire of the king. 
The sources for Craterus are scarce, so assumption must be kept to a minimum, but 
some basic duties of his position are evident. Plutarch says that Craterus had charge of his 
brother’s ilitary and do estic affairs (ἐπὶ τὸ στρατηγεῖν καὶ οἰκουρεῖν), but gives no details 
as to the nature of this position and mentions him only as an example of fraternal loyalty.
22
 
Further, Craterus had subordinate officials in Troizen and probably in Megara as well, both 
of which remained under direct Macedonian control.
23
 In each case officials were probably 
not civic, administrative figures (such as   istatēs), but phrourarchoi, since their positions 
are mentioned specifically in context with a garrison. While the sources tend to highlight the 
military role of Craterus, there seems to have been little in the way of civic administrative 
duties for the officials in this area. As it was, Craterus was left to further conquer the regions 
south of Thessaly, while the king himself concentrated on regaining and solidifying his hold 
on Macedonia and the northern regions lost after the capture of his father. Given that 
Antigonus and Pyrrhus also held the position of stratēgos of the Peloponnesus, the 
pro inence of Craterus’ role see s apparent. As Bengtson states, his position was essentially 
that of a co-regent, as it had been under Demetrius with Antigonus.
24
 The primacy of this 
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 Plut. De frat. amor. 486A. 
 
23
 Eudamades of Troizen was a direct subordinate: Polyaenus Strat. 2.29 (s.v. Cleonymus); cf. Frontinus (3.6.7), 
who says that Cleonymus held the Troizenians as qui praesidio Crateri tenebantur. 
 
24
 Bengtson (1944, p. 347) assumes his title ὁ στρατηγος ἐπὶ τῆς κοινῆς φυλακῆς, as earlier mentioned of 
Pyrrhus and Gonatas, and this assumption is probably warranted: “Wie da als ein στρατηγος ἐπὶ τῆς κοινῆς 
φυλακῆς καταλελειμμένος für die Zeit der Abwesenheit der Bundeshegemone, der Könige Antigonos 
Monophthalmos und Demetrios Poliorketes, in Griechenland geboten hat, so erscheint jetzt, allerdings als 
ständiger Vertreter, ein regelrechter Vizekönig des Antigonos Gonatas, und zwar in der Person seines 
halbbruders Krateros, des Sohnes des Krateros und der Phila.” 
  15 
station, then, is not indicative of Antigonid administration as a whole, but should be 
interpreted as a special appointment made only for individuals connected to the king by 
blood. 
Athens 
While Craterus had control over possessions south of Thessaly, circumstances there 
necessitated a change in the management of the area since matters remained uncertain in the 
Peloponnese for Antigonus. King Areus led a rejuvenated Sparta to war with the 
Macedonians backed by Ptolemy II, who now had control of the Aegean through an alliance 
with the Nesiotic League.
25
 Aratus of Sicyon under a new Achaean League began to bother 
the allied tyrants of the region, while Athens had yet to come fully under Macedonian 
control.
26
 Such events must have compelled Antigonus to place sole responsibility of the 
Peloponnese on Craterus and his son, Alexander, alleviating them of their duties in the 
Piraeus.
27
 The situation in Attica now called for unique means of administration, and 
Antigonus would take care not to have a revolt on his hands. One eventually arose, however, 
when Alexander, most likely a stratēgos like his father, rebelled against Antigonus after 
inheriting the position in 251, seeking his own claim to the throne.
 28
 Bengtson sees the revolt 
as a drastic change in the way the state was managed, though this system had probably 
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already began to change in the years leading up to the revolt of Alexander in the late 250s.
29
  
When Alexander then broke off in ca. 251, he does not seem to have controlled the Piraeus, 
as shown by his employment of pirates from Eretria against Attica. Strategically, however, it 
makes little sense to leave the official in charge of both Chalcis and Corinth with an 
independent commander in Athens. Thus, it seems likely that this position was gradually 
relegated to just Corinth and the Peloponnese. Due to recent events, the situation of Attica 
began to take on a life of its own, and as a result the administration of the south began to 
adapt in years prior to the revolt of Alexander. 
This change in the way that Athens was administered came in the 260s after the failed 
revolt of Athens in the so-called Chremonidian War. Prior to this conflict, however, the 
extent of Macedonian control in Attica has long been a matter of scholarly debate. The most 
recent conjectures assert that the Piraeus was held by an agent of the Macedonians, while the 
astu was in control of the Athenians themselves backed by Ptolemaic assistance.
30
 Following 
the defeat at the hands of the Macedonians in ca. 262, the existing apparatuses through which 
these areas were administrated fell to the king and his subordinates. The contentious garrison 
was once again placed on the Museion Hill, giving Antigonus a military presence within the 
heart of the city, all civic magistracies were suppressed, and Demetrius, grandson of 
Demetrius of Phaleron, was appointed as thesmothetes of the city.
31
 
The situation in the countryside is rather more difficult to glean from the existing 
evidence. However, a series of recently published inscriptions has shed much light on the 
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 Apollodorus, FGrHist. 244F44; Paus. 3.6.6; cf. Habicht 2003, pp. 52-55 and 1997, pp. 54, 153-54. 
  17 
state of affairs following the conclusion of the Chremonidian War. While the magistracies 
within the city itself were suppressed, the military appointments within the countryside were 
evidently still in place. An inscription dedicated by the local community of isoteleis in 
Rhamnous to an agent of Antigonus, Apollodorus of Otrynys, is the first evidence of this 
Macedonian policy in the Attic countryside.
32
 The position to which Apollodorus was 
appointed was that of stratēgos in charge of the local garrison and the “district near the sea” 
(Line 7: ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν). While the stratēgos there was originally believed to be 
the first of such Macedonian officials in the countryside, a recently discovered inscription has 
shed light on the position held by Apollodorus in the years after Antigonus’ victory over 
Athens.
33
 It is now apparent that a stratēgos had been present in Rhamnous as early as 356/5, 
thereby disproving Bengston’s hypothesis that such a position was a creation of the 
Antigonids.
34
 Thus, the stratēgia of Rhamnous was an Athenian institution that had been in 
place since the mid-fourth century accompanied by an apparent segmentation of the 
countryside into administrative divisions.
35
 This discovery changes previously held notions 
about Antigonid involvement in the Attic demes, where direct interference in the existing 
civic institutions by the king is apparent. Whereas earlier appointments needed only the 
endorsement of the demos, royal Macedonian approval was now necessary: ἐπει|[δὴ 
Ἀπολλόδωρος κ]ατασταθεὶς στρατηγὸς ὑπό τε τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου καὶ [ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου] 
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χειροτονηθεὶς (Lines 6-7).36 While this election may have been a mere formality, the incident 
shows that Antigonus was cautious not to upset the delicate dynamic between himself and the 
local populace. Such pretensions, however, were not always pushed aside since clear 
indications of the king’s control are evident (Lines 12-13: ἀκολούθως τῆι τοῦ | [βασιλέως 
προ]αιρέσει). 
The decree of Apollodorus illustrates a tendency of the Macedonians to use existing 
appointments and positions filled with loyal citizens. Apollodorus himself was an Athenian 
from the Attic deme of Otrynys, suggesting that emphasis remained on local, not royal, 
appointees.
37
 Once he gained confidence in the population, Antigonus ceased his interference 
into the election of these stratēgoi. While the appointment of these officials did return to 
hands of the people, Ioanna Kralli finds reason to believe that a candidate’s standing with the 
Macedonians was now a requisite co ponent of one’s selection and that the assembly must 
have taken such considerations into account when voting.
38
 While this claim is largely 
speculative, the supposition remains likely. At any rate, the appointment of an Athenian to 
the position shows Antigonus’ co  it ent to leave the ad inistration of civic institutions in 
the hands of locals and to use existing systems whenever possible. However, the king could 
and would become involved in the selection of officials. Given the recent history of Athens, 
this should come as no surprise. 
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While the date of the honorific decree of Apollodorus remains uncertain, the 
conclusion of the most recent editor, Vasileos Petrakos, places it in the year 257/6.
39
 Despite 
such difficulties, the decree of Apollodorus almost certainly falls within the period shortly 
after the conclusion of the Chremonidian War, placing its date close to Antigonus’ grant of 
independence and the removal of the garrison from the Museion Hill in 255.
40
 This grant, 
however, was perhaps more ostentation than it was reality since not all apparatuses of 
Macedonian military control were removed. Thus, it seems that Antigonus’ goal in Attica 
was not to grant freedom back to the Athenians, but rather to maintenance his control over 
Athens through less overt policies.
41
 As a symbol of foreign occupation, the Macedonian 
garrison would have been a matter of contention to the Athenians, and especially dangerous 
for the Antigonids given the tendencies of the Ptolemies to incite trouble through 
declarations of freedom and autonomy. To combat this problem, Antigonus himself 
proclaimed liberty to Athens and removed most evidence of his presence in Attica, beyond 
control of the port of Piraeus. The use of local positions filled by individuals favorable to the 
Macedonians could very well be a key component of such policies. 
Antigonus’ strategy helped to ease tension at a time of increased hostilities between 
Athens and Macedon, thereby allowing individuals to control the key administrative 
positions of local government for the king without the use of an overtly militaristic policy. 
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Further illustrating the point is the grant of a tax exemption (δωρεά) secured by Apollodorus 
for the local community of metics who made up the garrison. Once again, the decree of 
Apollodorus makes it clear that such an appeals system existed between Macedonian 
subordinate officials and the local population. The system was one of appeasement, not 
heavy-handed dictatorship, and seems to fit with the goals of the garrison’s removal from the 
Museion Hill. Having been through the turbulent years of the 280s, Antigonus understood the 
strategic significance of the fortress of Piraeus, and knew that Athens could be held with this 
alone. Anything else, particularly a highly visible garrison, would have created unwanted 
trouble. Moreover, the inscription of Apollodorus exemplifies this gradual adaptation of civic 
powers by the stratēgos as a means of coping with the position’s loss of military prestige. 
Unwittingly or not, this change was exploited by the Antigonid policy in Attica. 
Antigonus, as it seems, ceased making appointment to the stratēgia of Rhamnous 
after Apollodorus, but probably maintained a military presence in Attica itself.
42
 A decree 
from Rhamnous in honor of Dikaiarchos illustrates this point. As the document states, he was 
not selected for a specific office, such as stratēgos, but to a specific task: καὶ κατασταθεὶς 
μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς Ἀπολλωνίου ὑπὸ το[ῦ]|[βα]σιλέ[ως Ἀν]τ[ιγ]όνου ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ 
φρουρίου (Lines 5-6).43 That he was simply a phrourarchos, however, seems unlikely since 
the responsibilities of the garrison normally fell to the stratēgos of Rhamnous and sufficient 
evidence exists to show that this position continued after 255.
44
 Moreover, having two 
commanders set to the same task would have been redundant. Later, Dikaiarchos was 
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responsible for the protection of the garrison in Panakton and the “other district” of Attica 
(τῆς ἄλλης χώρας τῆς Ἀττικῆς), a previously unspecified area. Under Demeterius II, 
Dikaiarchos was appointed to the arche of Eretria by the king himself. Likewise, his father, 
Apollonius, held a position in Eleusis, possibly that of stratēgos, after serving with his son in 
Rhamnous.
45
 Such positions were most likely held by specific selection of the king as well, 
like his first appointment, but no specific mention of this is made. Conspicuously absent, 
however, is any indication that such appointments were made by a vote of the demos. 
Moreover, while the decree itself dates to the mid-230s, some arguments have stated that all 
these appointments were made prior to 255.
46
 On the contrary, the sustained narrative of the 
inscription seems to indicate that these selections were made in succession up to the 
enactment of the decree. In other words, Dikaiarchos must have held some position in the 
Attic plain successively from the 250s until the 230s. Though details are scarce, their activity 
between these years seems to indicate that the king maintained a military presence through 
his agents, even after the ostensible grant of freedom in 255. 
While the rest of Attica may have been made free, the Piraeus remained in the 
possession of an Antigonid official until the final expulsion of the Macedonians from Attica 
in 229. Original occupation of the port was made after the conclusion of the Lamian War in 
322 and seems to have continued in much the same way up to the Chremonidean War. In his 
work on philosophers, Diogenes Laertius makes first mention of the commander there, a 
certain Hierokles in charge of Mounychia and Piraeus (Ἱεροκλεῖ τῷ τὴν Μουνιχίαν ἔχοντι καὶ 
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τὸν Πειραιᾶ).47 Gary Reger has shown that Hierokles held this position during or slightly 
before the Chremonidean War.
48
 While not specifically called by this title, Hierokles was 
most likely a stratēgos since the areas he held resemble those of later attestations of these 
officials. Like the Museion Hill, the garrison in the Piraeus also seems to have been a matter 
of serious contention to the local population, with numerous attempts made for its 
expulsion.
49
 
Here too, Antigonid policies can be seen as undergoing changes to cope with the 
problems that arise from harsh control over such territories.  A decree in honor of Herakleitos 
of Athmonia, dating approxi ately to the sa e year as Alexander’s revolt, confirms this 
point.
50
 Given that the decree specifically entions the rebellion, Herakleitos’ appoint ent 
must predate this event (Lines 12-13: πολέμου γενομένου τοῦ περὶ Ἀ|λέξανδρον), and it is 
perhaps in this context that his appointment is most easily explained. His selection was made 
specifically to the position “in charge of the Piraeus and the other places administered with 
the Piraeus:” ὑπὸ τ|[ο]ῦ βασιλέως στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ Πε<ι>ραιέως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν | 
ταττομένων μετὰ τοῦ Πειραιέως (Lines 7-9). The ‘other places’ most likely refers to the 
adjacent coastal lands and Salamis since he also had control over the maintaince defensive 
walls there.
51
 Herakleitos is similarly honored in another surviving inscription by the people 
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for his commemoration of King Antigonus’ victory over the Celts in 277.52 Like 
Apollodorus, Herakleitos was an active official from Athens who had shown a favorable 
attitude towards the Macedonians and was thus appointed by the king to an important local 
position.
53
 The policy of Antigonus was to employ those not only capable of conducting the 
duties required of them in such a position, but also in possession of φιλοτιμία πρὸς τὸν 
βασιλέα.54 Such statements become increasingly more prevalent amongst accounts of these 
local military officials, showing the increasing need of the community to recognize both civic 
and royal obligations. Fro  the king’s perspective, the issuance of grants and appoint ents 
appeased local leaders and their respective peoples, making their relationship one of mutual 
cooperation and benefit. The emphasis placed on this reciprocity is an indication that 
Antigonid policies were working. 
When the Achaeans began inland raids on Attica in 239, Plutarch tells of a certain 
Diogenes, mentioned specifically in regard to the command of the garrison (ὁ μὲν τὸν 
Πειραιᾶ φρουρῶν).55 Ten years later, Diogenes remained in the same position and, upon the 
death of King Demetrius, is said to have abandoned Piraeus, Salamis, Munychia, and 
Sounion to Aratus for 150 talents. Given the territories mentioned, Bengtson thought 
Diogenes held the position of “Hauptstratege,” believing the position was analogous to what 
Craterus held in Corinth, but this assumption is completely without warrant.
56
 He based his 
                                                          
52
 Appendix, n. 5. 
 
53
 For a discussion on Herakleitos’ possible origins, see: Taylor 1997, pp. 250-56. 
 
54
 See Kralli 2006 and 2000 for a detailed discussion on the relationship between the Macedonian King and 
Attic military officials. 
 
55
 Plut. Arat. 34.2-5; cf. Habicht 1997, pp. 173, 179-80. 
 
56
 Bengston 1944, pp. 380-81 where he cites Beloch 1912, p. 455. 
 
  24 
assumption on the fact that the regions abandoned by Diogenes were comparable to “the 
areas ad inistered with the Piraeus” of Herakleitos. Bengtson must have believed the areas 
of the south needed a supreme commander as they had had under Craterus, but this simply 
does not seem to have been the case. In the same passage, Plutarch specifically mentions a 
stratēgos, a certain Bithys, who defeated Aratus at Phylakia in the Argolid, but no mention is 
made of him as an administrative official in charge of the particular district. Similarly, he 
could not have been the stratēgos of Corinth since that was still in the hands of the Achaean 
League. In all likelihood, Bithys was simply a military commander set with the task of 
defending against the growing hostility of the Achaean League. 
Corinth 
The situation in Corinth is much more difficult to reconstruct, since no epigraphic 
material regarding the stratēgoi survives. After the death of Alexander and the end of his 
failed revolt in 245, territorial possessions of the Peloponnesus were given back to Antigonus 
by Alexander’s wife, Nicaea. Shortly thereafter, Corinth was soon lost again to Aratus in 
243, and would not become an Antigonid possession until the war with Cleomenes forced 
Aratus to surrender to the Macedonian King in return for military assistance against Sparta in 
the 220s. Up to then, Antigonus’ possession of the south had relied on the citadel of Corinth 
as the locus of its administrative goals in the region, providing such a strong base for 
operations that intrusion into neighboring poleis could remain minimal. Only in Megara and 
Troizen, for instance, is there evidence of direct control.
57
 The remaining Peloponnesian 
cities were under the sway of the Antigonids, but little attempt was ever made to bring them 
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squarely into the Macedonian domain. Antigonus, as Polybius states, preferred to support 
friendly political factions within the cities, often tyrants.
58
 This statement is confirmed by 
Plutarch’s account of Aratus, who fought several of these tyrants before reestablishing the 
Achaean League. His capture of the acropolis at Corinth provides the opportunity to study 
the Antigonid system in the Peloponnese after Alexander. Once again a stratēgos was put in 
charge of the operations there, but little hint is given in our sources that the position was as 
significant as it had been under Craterus.
59
 
Upon the second occupation of Corinth in 245, it seems that the fortress was under 
dual management. Polyaenus mentions Archelaus, the stratēgos, and Persaeus, the 
philosopher and   istatēs. Plutarch, however, seems to have difficulty with his terminology 
here, calling Archelaus both stratēgos and ὁ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἡγεμὼν. It seems doubtful, 
however, that Archelaus had anywhere near the power of that of his successors in Corinth. 
Pausanias, meanwhile, makes no mention of Archelaus, but describes Persaeus as ἐπὶ τῇ 
φρουρᾷ τεταγμένος; however, he has probably confused Persaeus with Theophrastus, the 
garrison commander. This interpretation seems plausible since in other accounts Persaeus 
was not killed by Aratus, but he was in Pausanias. Neither version seems entirely 
trustworthy. In all likelihood, one should take Persaeus as the   istatēs, that is, the royal 
 anager of the city’s affairs. So e dispute exists a ongst scholars about whether the 
appointment of epistatai was royal or local, but it seems reasonable here to assume that after 
the defection of Alexander Antigonus took the initiative to appoint someone whose trust was 
assured; or perhaps he broke up responsibilities amongst the three individuals. Still, it is quite 
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difficult to say what, if any, transformation took place at Corinth after Antigonus regained it 
from the wife of Alexander, Nicaea. Judging from the emphasis of our sources, Persaeus may 
have had primacy in Corinth, but this is possibly just a result of his fame and connection with 
the philosopher Zeno. If Persaeus’ apparent authority in the narrative is warranted, then 
perhaps civic administration had taken primacy over military, as both the officers, 
Theophrastus and Archelaus, seem to be subordinate. At any rate, at Corinth there was little 
time between Antigonus’ reestablishment of control in 245 and Aratus’ seizure in 243. 
Then, after nearly two decades in the hands of the Achaean League, Corinth once 
again came into the Antigonid sphere when Aratus was forced to offer it back to Antigonus 
Doson in 224 as part of the negotiations for assistance against Cleomenes of Sparta. 
Thereafter, Macedonian control of the Peloponnese was increased. Mantineia was refounded 
as Antigoneia, and Macedonian garrisons were placed in Orchomenos, Heraia, and Corinth.  
Moreover, the so-called Hellenic League was founded with Antigonus at the top as hegemon. 
After his victory over Cleomenes at Sellasia in 222, Antigonus Doson put Brachyllas the 
Boiotian in a nonpermanent position in charge of Sparta.
60
 
Once these affairs were settled in the Peloponnese, Antigonus departed to Macedonia 
after some Illyrian raids had disrupted Macedonia, leaving Taurion in charge of the 
Peloponnese.
61
 The language here is startlingly evocative of earlier such appointments for 
governors of the Peloponnese in the transitional period after Antigonus Monophthalmus. 
That Taurion was a stratēgos, however, remains uncertain since he was never explicitly 
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called one. In fact, the only mention of his appointment is quite vague. Nevertheless, his 
position within the region may indicate an attempt at regional administration in the 
Peloponnese similar to what Antigonus Gonatas had with Craterus. Taurion evidently had 
control over virtually every aspect of governance in the region. He is seen playing a 
significant role in the Social War with the Aitolian League, providing military support from 
the south with the assistance of the Aratus and the Achaean League. Furthermore, his 
diplomatic duties were shown in the negotiations with the Aetolians for the establishment of 
peace in 217, when he was the lead representative of the embassy.
62
 In addition to his 
military control, he had say over financial matters, funding the fleet as they crossed the 
Isthmus.
63
 The trust shown by Philip V, who retained him in the Peloponnese upon 
Antigonus’ death, is undoubtedly significant. 
Moreover, the fact that Taurion was the only official of Philip V given the oversight 
over a region seems to indicate the uniqueness of the Peloponnese in terms of administration. 
Apelles was to be left as guardian (epitropos), Leontius was the commander of the peltasts, 
Megaleus was the chief secretary, Alexander was the chief body guard, and Taurion was left 
in the Peloponnese.
64
 For the others, the duties were not regional administration, but specific 
tasks within the army and the royal court. This seems to show that there was a certain 
significance given to the affairs of the Peloponnese and not the others. As important as 
matters up in the north were (the Illyrians had just raided Macedonia where the Romans were 
also becoming more involved), it is quite surprising that a regional governor was left only for 
the southern districts and not others. Corinth, as it was, remained an integral part in the 
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control of the south under the Antigonids. Its primacy under Taurion and Craterus, however, 
should not suggest that such a system was indicative of Greece as a whole. These special 
royal appointments were anomalies in an otherwise localized administration. 
Following Taurion, the administration of Corinth seems to have fallen to a number of 
lower magistrates, none of whom seem to have had the significance of either Taurion or 
Craterus. Livy mentions Androsthenes who was in charge of the local fort and its troops.
65
 
Moreover, a certain Philokles is named, but only in connection with local affairs.
66
 The 
closest mention of any of these officials in regards to regional administration is when 
Philokles is called qui Corintho Argisque praeerat in 198-197. As the latest evidence shows, 
the official in Corinth typically had far less control over the land south of Thessaly than has 
previously been believed. Moreover, the stratēgos of the Piraeus seems to have been 
independent of the commander in Corinth. As the decrees of Dikaiarchos and Apollodorus 
show, the local officials of a district could be appointed by the king and interact directly with 
him without an intermediary. 
This evidence points to a more localized nature of Antigonid administration, and not 
the regional model that previous scholars have believed. The need for both political and 
military dominance in the southern regions of Greece was addressed by using the office of 
the stratēgos as a combined office of the two means of power. In Corinth, a gradual emphasis 
away from the regional model of governance under Craterus is evident. Taurion’s later 
appointment to the position is similarly not indicative of general administration of the south. 
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In Attica, the situation was quite different. Here, the local stratēgos was retained over the 
royal one of the Macedonian king, a point only made clear by recent epigraphical evidence. 
This point typifies the methods of Antigonid administration in this area. The officers here 
gradually developed and inherited civic powers as a means of coping with the new realities 
of their position. While the exact relationship of these local officials with the king remains 
unclear, it is evident that they were able to deal with him directly and that appeals for 
benefits were heard. More recent scholarship has emphasized the local nature of Antigonid 
administration over the poleis of Greece, particularly in respect to the office of   istatēs.67 
The evidence put forth above verifies such conclusions. It seems that true royal supervisory 
officials were rare and frequently only temporary. In general, Antigonid policy seemed to be 
sensitive to the cultural and social implications of maintaining tight control over the poleis 
through garrisons.
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 This is an important point when discussing the nature of Macedonian administration of the poleis. It has been 
discussed in great deal about other offices, but never the stratēgos: Errington 2002 and Hammond 1999. 
 
   
 
 
 
Stratēgoi of the Northern Regions 
 
Thus far, my discussion of stratēgoi has been focused on Attica and the Peloponnese, 
but the regions in the north always held a significant position for the king in terms of 
administration. Politically, the city-state tradition of southern Greece was much more 
strongly rooted in the south than in the north, where, due to the historical development of 
Macedon, the independence of the cities remained rather weak. As a result, problems of 
integration were not nearly as widespread as those in the south. As close as Macedon was to 
these areas, their protection became of utmost importance, especially given the evident 
frequency of raids conducted by the tribes north of Macedonia proper. It was, however, the 
location of both the king and the royal army, and thus Macedonian hegemony was far more 
secure. The area demanded less overt military intrusion than in the south. Nonetheless, the 
administration of the northern regions remained vital to the administrative goals of the 
kingdom. Prominence in these regions, however, seemed to remain with   istatēs, whether 
royal or local, and with traditional institutions in place before the Macedonian occupation. 
Antigonid administration thus relied on these very offices with minimal royal supervision 
and interference. Due to the close connection, loyalty in these regions was more assured and 
thus required less military intrusion. 
Much of the evidence for stratēgoi in the northern regions comes from the opening 
lines of decrees and the initial pronouncements made for the issueing of the laws. Two 
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inscriptions, unpublished at the time of Bengston, reveal that local administration remained 
in several cities in the north (and Macedonia proper in particular). In Philippoi, for instance, 
there was a board of stratēgoi responsible, in part, for recruitment of foreign mercenaries and 
the protection of theoric embassies for King Antigonus.
68
 Similarly, a council of stratēgoi in 
Cassandreia seems to have had legislative duties (Line 2: οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ νομοφύλακες 
εἶπαν), perhaps as a board to make motions for policies under the approval of the king (Line 
10: κατὰ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως βούλησιν) along with a board of local magistrates 
(nomophylakes).
69
 As in the south, the proper relationship between king and city is stressed 
as a matter of importance. Errington believed these officials were also responsible for 
policing and recruitment of mercenaries from the local districts, which explains the comment 
behind Philip V’s recruit ent “fro  the cities.”70 As Militiades Hatzopoulos has shown, 
however, these boards were not introducted by King Antigonus as part of constitutional 
reforms when the city came under Macedonian control in 285/4.
71
 Rather, such boards were 
part of an existing political framework within the city. 
In two areas there is evidence for the stratēgos as an annual, eponymous office. First, 
an inscription from Moryllos dating to 208/7 seems to indicate a dating formula based on the 
local stratēgia.72 The inscription does this in two separate instances. The first was with the 
mention of the strategia of Demetrius, son of Sopatros (Lines 3-4: ἐπὶ τῆς Δημητρίου τοῦ 
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 Appendix, n. 7 and 8; A similar body of stratēgoi is seen in Eretria, who, along with the probouloi, made 
several motions, see: IG XII, 9 199; 206; 208; 209; Lysimacheia: Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 3. 
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 Errington 1990, pp. 229-31; cf. Livy 33.19.3. 
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 Appendix, n. 9. 
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Σωπάτρου στρατηγίας), and the second was with the strategia of Epinikos (Line 8: ἐπὶ τῆς 
Ἐπινίκου στρατηγίας), apparently years later. This evidence would seem to suggest an annual 
appointment for the stratēgoi in Macedonian proper, much like the archon of classical 
Athens. This point is further confirmed by the gymnasiarchic law of Beroia. The decree 
begins with dating formula peculiar to the city, stating “when Hippokrates, son of 
Nikokratos, was stratēgos” (Line 1: ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦντος Ἱπποκράτου τοῦ Νικοκράτου).73 
While the appointment of these officials remains uncertain, it seems unlikely that they were 
appointees of the king. The annual nature of the office would seem to suggest an election by 
locals, but whether through council or assembly is unknown. It remains a possibility that the 
eponymous stratēgos, like the archons of Athens, was simply one of a board of these 
officials, but such information cannot be gleaned from the existing evidence. Additionally, 
the significant degree to which the dating formulae varied seems to indicate that traditional 
institutions remained even under Antigonid occupation. The kings, as it were, do not seem to 
have imposed any specific magistracies or dating formulae onto these cities. Local offices 
were preserved. 
Following his defeat in 197 by Quintus Flamininus, Philip V gradually attempted to 
build up the territories that had once been under the control of the Macedonian king. While 
the treaty with the Romans confined him to the traditional boundaries of Macedonia, Philip 
attempted expansion into northern territories which were of little concern to the Romans. One 
of these areas was Paionia, where Bengston believed there was evidence to suggest that it 
was an administrative district under the supervision of a stratēgos.74 Livy makes mention of 
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 Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 62. 
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 Bengston 1944, p. 344. 
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Didas in Paionia in 184 who served the king as ex praetoribus regiis unus qui Paeoniae 
praeerat and Paeoniae praetor.
75
 He is further connected with the assassination of Philip V’s 
son, Demetrius, in 181, and was seen again ten years later as a commander responsible for 
arming and deploying troops from the region. The pro inence of Didas in Livy’s account 
comes from his connection with the assassination of Demetrius.
 
Bengtson, who describes 
Didas’ position as “viz  ӧ iglic   St ll  g”, believed that Didas was one in a line of 
succession of regional Paionian governors (whom he labels stratēgoi).76 On the contrary, he 
was more likely a prominent local figure who perhaps served the Paionians on a board of 
officials. Given the lack of temporal words in the passage, I take the term used here, ex 
praetoribus regiis unus, as an indication that Didas was one membr from a body of officials 
of unspecified number, rather than one from a line of successive governors. Thus, his 
identification as a regional governor is very unlikely. 
Recently published inscriptions are quite illuminating about the administrative system 
of the northern regions, particularly Macedonia proper. Evident is a system of magistracies 
that seems to have functioned independently in each polis. While it remains unclear whether 
these officials were selected by royal appointment or local election, it is certain that stratēgoi 
were present within Upper Macedonia and not simply the regions of recent acquisition, as 
previous scholarship had assumed. The conclusion drawn from this analysis puts to rest 
Bengtson’s hypothesis that these officers were eant as regional governors outside the 
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 40.21.9; 40.23.2; 42.51.5-6; Painoia: Poly. 5.97; the name Didas in these passages has often been 
misinterpreted as Derdas, a Macedonian name: Merker 1965, p. 38 n. 18 and pp. 51-53 for an analysis of 
Paionian-Macedonian relations; following Bengtson, he takes Didas to be a stratēgos; Bengston 1944, p. 344. 
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 1944, p. 341. Unlike Bengston, I fail to see ex praetoribus regiis unus qui Paeoniae praeerat as an indication 
that he was a stratēgos acting as a regional governor for the Antigonids. 
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traditional boundaries, and were not present within Macedonia proper, as they most certainly 
were. On the contrary, the neighboring regions of Macedonia show a severe lack of 
uniformity in their magistracies. Priests, epistatai, nomophylakes, agoranomoi, and archons 
are among the offices attested in the epigraphic evidence as having served as chief officials 
of the various regions.
77
 Each polis in the north seems to have possessed its own unique 
council of magistrates, priests, or even, in some cases, a popular assembly.
78
 Given the most 
recent evidence, it seems misguided to think of northern Greece as divided up into 
administrative regions overseen by stratēgoi.
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The Stratēgos as an Independent Ruler 
 
As stated in previous sections, one of the primary goals of the stratēgoi was to 
establish Macedonian dominance over recently conquered territories. While this seems to 
have been the case in a few examples, another separate case points to a somewhat different 
picture of the one seen up to this point. Thus far, the title of stratēgos had been granted to 
individuals who exercised power under an agreement with the Macedonian king and to those 
whose appointment was contingent upon him. The following example will show that the title 
of stratēgos could represent an individual who possessed sufficient control over a small 
region to exert power on a regional basis, but not enough to oppose the greater strength of the 
kings in the adjacent areas. That is, the individual was, or could be, a ruler of a small region 
who had his own claims to rule but came into peaceful agreement with the Macedonians 
through mutual cooperation. Caria, which had first been placed under the Antigonid sphere 
by an alliance with an independent stratēgos, shows evidence of the process whereby newly 
acquired territories gradually came under the supervision of civic officials from the local 
population. 
One such individual is Olympichos of Caria. As an independent dynast in Asia 
Minor, Olympichos was first brought into the Antigonid sphere after Antigonos Doson sailed 
his fleet into southwest Anatolia in 227. Olympichos, who had earlier been a stratēgos of 
Seleucus in 235, retained the same role but came under Antigonid supervision shortly after 
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this campaign.
79
 The dearth of evidence, however, makes it necessary to conjecture about the 
circumstances behind this expedition. The only literary source for the time claims that the 
affair to be one of military conquest.
80
 This assumption, however, is perhaps not so accurate. 
A more likely explanation is that Antigonus traveled to Asia Minor as part of an arbitration 
expedition perhaps called by the Rhodians, Mylasians, or Iasians to cope with the growing 
hostility of Olympichos towards them.
81
 Why the king took on such a role, however, remains 
uncertain. But, it seems likely that he was attempting to exert more influence in the region 
against the growing expansion of Antiochus. 
Surviving documents suggest that the primary role of the relationship between the 
king and Olympichos was one of adjudication. In a letter to Olympichos, Philip V issued 
orders regarding a problem that had arisen concerning the lands and sanctuary of Mylasa, 
about which Olympichos had written to Philip (τὴν παρὰ σοῦ ἐπιστολὴν ἀνέγνων ἣν 
ἐγεγράφεις). An inscription from the Rhodians shows the importance of Oly pichos’ role in 
relation to the king of Macedon. Following an attack on Iasos in 220, the Rhodians stress a 
proper relationship for Olympichos with that of the king by making an appeal to the latter for 
a resolution of the problems.
82
 The letter emphasizes an appeal of the king’s orders (Line 78: 
ἀκολούθως τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπισταλεῖσιν). What right King Philip had in making 
commands for this instance is unclear, but his pronouncements do seem to have held some 
weight with both parties. However, the fact that Olympichos was able to conduct such 
activities in the first place shows his independence. The Macedonian king had some say over 
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the foreign policy of the local ruler, but Olympichos was not obliged to have this decision 
approved beforehand. One can see from these documents that Olympichos held a subordinate 
position to that of Philip, though his role in administrative structure seems rather different 
from most officials mentioned thus far. This, too, explains Polybius’ description of hi  as a 
   astēs.83 Once again, there was a tendency for the Antigonids to leave existing system in 
place once they came under their domain. This policy explains Oly pichos’ title as 
stratēgos. 
The date of Oly pichos’ death and the end of Macedonian influence in Caria are 
uncertain, and only Philip’s ca paign into Caria in 201 is known. As part of the concessions 
following the Second acedonian War, the cities in Philip’s control are said to have been 
handed over to the Romans, including Caria (Cariaeque alias urbes quas Philippus 
tenuisset).
84
 Philip’s control, however, ay not have been as solidly founded as one ight 
assume from this statement. Just a few years prior, Philip had made an attempt to consolidate 
his control in Thrace, and inexplicably began a naval campaign in the Aegean areas 
surrounding Caria. The region remained in nominal control of Deinokrates who evidently 
had military command over the region.
85
 Bengtson interprets his title, regius praefectus as 
that of ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως στρατηγὸς, but the association between Livy’s use this ter  and the 
Greek title is uncertain.
86
 The mention of Deinocrates in a military context should not 
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immediately lead one to assume that he was a stratēgos. Other such officials mentioned in 
two inscriptions in the ti e of Philip’s occupation of Caria seem to have had military 
responsibilities. In an inscription dating to 198, a certain Asclepiades is honored by the 
koinon of the Panamarians for his dutiful service as   istatēs to King Philip, who had 
appointed him to the position.
87
 A military role for this office seems likely (Lines 9-11). 
Similarly, two brothers are mentioned in Herakleia as epistatai in service of an unspecified 
king, though the inscription’s date is uncertain. Some arguments, however, place it mostly 
likely in the ti e of Philip’s occupation of the region.88 What remains certain, however, is 
that when Caria came squarely into the Macedonian sphere, its administration after 
Oly pichos’ death was conducted by means of royal representativs, not stratēgoi. The 
evidence here shows that areas traditionally under the auspices of a regional commander, as 
Olympichos was under Seleucus, gradually fell to the supervision of royal representatives. 
This example is instructive for the methods of administration employed by the Antigonid 
kings and the process of integrating neighboring territories into the Macedonian sphere. The 
stratēgos does not seem to have been a permanent institution for administration of the region.
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The Administration of the Antigonid State 
 
Traditional views regarding Antigonid administration hold that royal appointees, 
typically   istatēs, were placed in the individual cities of Macedonia proper, while the 
neighboring regions were controlled by a regional governor, a stratēgos. This thesis has 
shown that recent epigraphic finds in Macedonia proper and the north territories disprove 
such a notion. What remains undisputed is that boards of stratēgoi in Macedonia proper acted 
as local magistrates appointed perhaps for the purpose of recruitment and enforcement. To 
speak of regional stratēgiai in the north, and especially Upper Macedonia, is difficult. Within 
this region the administration of the kingdom remained with local boards of magistrates and 
eponymous officials. Within each city there was a local representative of the king, an 
  istatēs, who was responsible for overseeing the royal prerogatives within the city and 
making sure that any orders passed to him were executed according to the king’s will. In 
most cases, the stratēgos worked alongside the epistatai and the two were not mutually 
exclusive offices, as previous scholarship has stated.
89
 To think of Antigonid administration 
as local with royal oversight seems like the most likely and logical view. An over-
encompassing organizational structure with stratēgoi at the heads of regional districts does 
not seem to be the case. 
Moreover, the thesis has shown that the office of the stratēgoi, such as in Athens, 
were often existing institutions operating in administrative districts which the Antigonids 
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exploited. Thus, the office of the stratēgos was not an Antigonid creation, but an existing 
official usually operating in the function of a board and through local jurisdiction and 
appointment. Given the continuity seen with Macedonian administration, it is likely that most 
of these offices were in existence before the Macedonians brought them into their kingdom. 
Only in the cases of Corinth and Thrace can one speak of true Antigonid military governors. 
Even then, as in the case of Corinth, it seems difficult to see these individuals as permanent, 
administrative officials. Moreover, the term stratēgia is never used within any surviving 
Antigonid documents to describe a region or district, but only the office. It seems difficult to 
conceive of a uniform regional organization of the kingdom without making extraordinary 
assumptions in order to do so. 
While more work needs to be done on the subject, the body of evidence presented 
here points to a more localized administrative system, even within offices of a military 
nature. The Antigonid kingdom was a variegated and multifarious state composed of dozens 
of city-states and villages, each with its own existing institutions and structures. These 
subordinate polities were then overseen not on a regional basis, but by supervisory officials 
tasked specifically with the duty of communicating the orders of the king. Military 
supervision seems to have been far less comprehensive than previously believed, even in the 
south. On the contrary, Antigonid military policies were much more sensitive to the local 
populations and their traditional institutions than one might expect from a cursory analysis. 
This is not to deny that the Macedonians were concerned with military supremacy, but 
merely to affirm that they sought to maintain it with the aid and use of local systems. In this 
regard, Antigonid policy was keenly aware of the sensitivities of the local communities and 
their sentiments regarding foreign occupation.
 
   
Appendix: Epigraphic Sources 
 
1. Honorary Decree from Rhamnous (356/5 BCE) 
This inscription was discovered in the Greek Archaeological Society’s excavations about two decades 
ago. The bibliography is thus somewhat limited. 
Gauthier, BE (1997), 216. Ed. Pr.Petrakos, I Rhamnountos II, n. 1. 
 
1 [ὁ δεῖνα τοῦ — —]μου Προσπάλτιος εἶπεν· 
[ἐπειδὴ Φιλοκλῆς] καὶ Διόδω [ρ]ος χιλίαρχοι κ [α]- 
[τασταθέντες ὑπ]ὸ Διομ [ήδ]ου [το]ῦ σ τρα[τη]- 
[γοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν] ἐπὶ Ἐλ [πίνο]υ ἄρ[χ]οντο[ς] 
5 [καλῶς κ]αὶ φιλοτίμως ἐ[πε]μελήθ[ησ]αν τῆ[ς] 
[τε φυλ]ακῆς τοῦ φρουρίου κ[αὶ τοῦ στρα]τηγοῦ 
[καὶ τ]ῶν στρατιωτῶν τῶν πολιτικῶν τῶν τα- 
[χθ]έντων μεθ’ ἑαυτῶν ἐν Ῥαμνοῦντι, πολ- 
[λὴν] ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι, διετέ[λε]σαν 
10 [λέγ]οντες καὶ πράττοντες τὰ συμφέ[ροντα] 
[ὑ]πὲρ αὐτῶν, ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὴν εὔν[οιαν] 
[ἣν] ἔχουσι περὶ αὐτούς, ἀγαθεῖ τύχει· [δεδό]- 
[χ]θαι τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπαινέσαι Φιλ [οκ]λ έα 
[Π]ροκλέους Ἑκαλῆθεν, Διόδωρον Οἰνο[στρά]- 
15 [τ]ου Ἀναγυράσιον καὶ στεφανῶσαι ἑκ[άτερ]ον  
[αὐ]τῶν χρυσῶι στεφάνωι κατὰ τὸν νόμο[ν ἀρε]- 
[τ]ῆς ἕνεκα καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἣν ἔχοντες [τυγχά]- 
[ν]ουσιν πρός τε τὸν στρατηγὸν Διομ[ήδ]ην 
[κ]αὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας· ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψή- 
20 [φ]ισμα ἐν στήλει λιθίνει τοὺς αἱρεθέντας 
[τ]ῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ στῆσαι ἐν Ῥαμνοῦντι ἐν 
[τ]ῶι ἱερῶι τοῦ Διονύσου, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀναγραφ[ὴν] 
[τῆ]ς στήλης καὶ τὴν ἀνάθεσιν δοῦναι τὸ ἀ[νά]- 
24 [λω]μα τοὺς στρατιώτα〚— — — — — — — — —〛 
 
 Lines 15-16: ἕκ[αστ]ον Petrakos. 
 
 
 
2. Honorary Decree for Apollodorus from Rhamnous (258/57) 
Due to the illegibility of the archon’s na e, the date for this decree is largely based on historical 
grounds. Christian Habicht dates the inscription between 260 and 245. Luigi Moretti restores the 
archon date as either 244/3 (Kydenor) or 259/8 (Antiphon). The most recent editor of the inscription, 
Vasileos Petrakos, places the date at 256/5, the most likely date in light of recent discoveries. 
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Petrakos, I Rhamnountos II, n. 8.  Moretti, ISE, n. 22; SEG 3.122; Pouilloux, Forteresse de 
Rhamnonte, n. 7; Smith, Staatsverträge, n. 477; Habicht 1979, p. 71. Ed. Pr. Charpouthier, BCH 47 
(1924), 264. 
 
1 οἱ ἰσοτελεῖς [οἱ ἰ]σοτελεῖς 
τὸν στρατηγὸν τὸν ἐπιμελητὴν 
Ἀπολλόδωρον Ἔνδιον 
Ἀπολλοδώρου Αἰσχέου 
5 Ὀτρυνέα Αἰθαλίδην 
  
6 [ἔδοξε τῶν ἰσο]τελῶν τοῖς τεταγμένοις Ῥαμνοῦντι, Τείσανδρος εἶπεν· ἐπει- 
[δὴ Ἀπολλόδωρος κ]ατασταθεὶς στρατηγὸς ὑπό τε τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου καὶ 
[ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου] χειροτονηθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν 
[ἐπὶ ․․6․․․]ο[υ] ἄρχοντος, ἐπιμεμέληται καλῶς καὶ συμφερόντως τῆς τε ἄλ- 
10 [λης φρουρᾶς πάσης] καὶ τῶν ἰσοτελῶν ὅπως ἂν ὡς δικαιότατα καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἕκαστος 
[λειτουργεῖ, ἐπε]μελήθη δὲ καὶ τῆς δοκιμασίας ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰσοτελείας ὅπως 
[ἂν ὡς τάχιστα] ἐπικυρωθε[ῖ] τοῖς ἐγ Ῥαμνοῦντος ἡ δωρεὰ ἀκολούθως τῆι τοῦ 
[βασιλέως προ]αιρέσει, διατελεῖ δὲ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα χρείας παρεχόμενος καὶ κοι- 
[νῆι καὶ ἰδίαι ἑκ]άστωι· ὅπως ἂν οὖν εἰδῶσιν πάντες ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἰσοτελεῖς τοὺς φιλο- 
15 τιμ[ουμέν]ους εἴς τε τὸμ βασιλέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ εἰς ἑαυτοὺς τιμῶσιν, ἀγαθῆι 
τύχηι· δεδόχθαι τῶν ἰσοτελῶν τοῖς τεταγμένοις Ῥαμνοῦντι ἐπαινέσαι τὸν 
στ[ρα]τηγὸ[ν] Ἀπολλόδωρον Ἀπολλοδώρου Ὀτρυνέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν χρυσῶι 
στε[φ]άνωι κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ δικαιοσύνης τῆς εἴς τε τὸν βασι- 
λέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ τῆς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων· ἀναγράψαι δὲ 
20 [τόδ]ε τὸ ψήφισμα ἐν στήληι λιθίνηι καὶ στῆσαι ἐν τῶι ἱερῶι τοῦ Διονύσου, ἑλέ- 
[σθαι δὲ ἤ]δη ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἄνδρας τρεῖς οἵτινες ἐπιμελήσονται τῆς τε ἀναγρα- 
[φῆς τοῦ ψ]ηφίσματος καὶ τῆς ποιήσεως τῆς στήλης· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπι- 
[μελητὴν τὸν] κατασταθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Ἀπολλοδώρου Ἔνδιον Αἰσχέο[υ] 
[Αἰθαλίδην καὶ στεφανῶσαι] αὐτὸν θαλλοῦ στεφάνωι δικαιοσύνης ἕνεκα καὶ εὐ- 
25 [νοίας· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν πυ]λωρὸν Ὀφέλαν Ὠφελίωνος ἰσοτελῆ καὶ στεφαν[ῶ]- 
[σαι αὐτὸν θαλλοῦ στεφάν]ωι· οἵδε εἱρέθησαν, Τείσανδρος Ἱπποκλ[έους, — — —] 
 
Line 8: the phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου often accompanies the participle χειροτονηθεὶς. 
See IG II
2
 682. 
 
3. Honorific Decree for Dikaiarchos from Rhamnous (235/4) 
Petrakos, I Rhamnountos II, n. 17. Pouilloux, Forteresse de Rhamnonte, n. 15; Moretti, ISE, n. 25; 
Roussel, BCH 54 (1930), 268-282; SEG 25.155. Ed. Pr. Stauropoullos, Hellenika 3 (1930), 153-62. 
 
1 ἐπὶ Ἐκφάντου ἄρχοντος, ἔδοξεν Ῥαμνουσίοις, Ἐλπίνικος 
[Μ]νησίππου Ῥαμνούσιος εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ Δικαίαρχος πατρικὴν 
[π]αρειληφὼς φιλίαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸ 
[κ]οινὸν τῶν Ῥαμνοῦντι ταττομένων διαφυλάττει τὴν φιλί- 
5 [α]ν, καὶ κατασταθεὶς μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς Ἀπολλωνίου ὑπὸ το[ῦ] 
[βα]σιλέ[ως Ἀν]τ[ιγ]όνου ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ φρουρίου καλ[ῶς] 
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καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμελήθη τῆς τε φυλακῆς τοῦ φρουρίου καὶ 
τῶν οἰκούντων ἐν αὐτῶι, εὔτακτον παρέχων αὑτόν τε καὶ τοὺς 
στρατιώτας τοὺς ὑπὸ τὸν πατέρα ταττομένους καὶ διὰ 
10 ταῦτα αὐτοὺς ἀμφοτέρους Ῥαμνούσιοι καὶ Ἀθηναίων οἱ οἰ- 
κοῦντες τὸ φρούριον ἐστεφάνωσαν χρυσῶι στεφάνωι κατὰ 
τὸν νόμον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπ’ Ἐλευσῖνος γενόμενος ὁ πατὴρ 
[αὐ]τοῦ ἐπεινέθη καὶ ἐστεφανώθη ὑπό τε τῶν Ἐλευσινίων καὶ τῶν ἄλ- 
λων Ἀθηναίων τῶν οἰκούντων ἐν τῶι φρουρίωι· καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸς 
15 κατασταθεὶς εἰς Πάνακτον καλῶς καὶ ἐνδόξ[ω]ς ἐπεμελήθη 
τῆς τε τοῦ φρουρίου φυλακῆς καὶ τῆς ἄλλης χώρας τῆς Ἀττι- 
κῆς καὶ νῦν τεταγμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Δημητρίου ἐν τεῖ 
ἄκραι τεῖ Ἐρετριέων διατελεῖ εὔνους ὢν τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀθη- 
ναίων καὶ κοινεῖ πᾶσιν καὶ ἰδίαι τοῖς ὑπεκτεθημένοις τὰ βοσκή- 
20 ματα διὰ τὸν πόλεμον διασώιζων καὶ βοηθῶν εἰς ὃ ἂν αὐτ[όν] 
τις παρακαλεῖ· καὶ παραγενομένου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Φιλοκή- 
[δ]ου εἰς Ἐρέτριαν συνηγόρησέν τε τούτωι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν 
[ἕ]να ἀπηγμένον ἐπὶ θανάτωι ἐξείλετο ἐκ τοῦ [δε]σμωτηρί[ου] 
καὶ ἀνέσωισεν ἀποδεικνύμενος τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν ἔχει πρὸς 
25 τοὺς πολίτας· ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον 
εἰς ὃ ἂν αὐτόν τις παρακαλεῖ ἢ κοινεῖ ὁ δῆμος ἢ ἰδίαι τις τῶ[ν] 
πολιτῶν χρείας παρέξεσθαι· ἔδωκεν δὲ καὶ ἱερεῖα εἰς τὴν θυ- 
σίαν τῶν Νεμεσίων καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, ἐγλειπου- 
[σ]ῶν τῶν θυσιῶν διὰ τὸν πόλεμον, ὅπως ἔχει καλῶς τὰ πρὸς 
30 [τ]ὰς θεὰς Ῥαμνουσίοις, τύχει τεῖ ἀγαθεῖ· δεδόχθαι Ῥαμνου- 
σίοις καὶ τοῖς [ἄλ]λοις Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τ[οῖ]ς οἰκοῦσιν ἐν Ῥαμνοῦν- 
τι πᾶσιν, ἐπαινέσαι Δικαίαρχον [Ἀπο]λλωνίου Θριάσιον ἀρ[ε]- 
τῆς ἕνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας ἣν ἔχων διατελεῖ εἴς τε τὸν [βασιλέ]- 
α Δ[ημήτριον] καὶ εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἰς τὸ 
35 κοινὸν τῶν οἰκ[ού]ντων Ῥαμνοῦντα καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν χρυ- 
σῶι στεφάνωι κατὰ τὸν νόμον· ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισ- 
μα τοὺς ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ τὸν δήμαρχο[ν] τὸν Ῥαμνουσίων 
ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις δυεῖν ἵνα εἶ ὑπόμνημα τοῖς βουλομένοις 
εὐεργετεῖν τὸ κοινὸν Ῥαμνουσίων καὶ τῶν οἰκούντων τὸ φρού- 
40 ριον καὶ στῆσαι τὴν μὲν ἐν τῶι τεμένει τοῦ Διονύσου, τὴν δ’ ἐν 
τῶι Νεμεσίωι· εἰς δὲ τὴν ποίησιν τῶν στηλῶν καὶ τὴν ἀναγρ[α]- 
φὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος μερίσαι τὸν ταμίαν τὸν Ῥαμνουσίων 
τὸ ἀναλωθὲν καὶ λογίσασθαι τοῖς δημόταις· ἑλέσθαι δὲ κ[αὶ] 
ἐξ ἑαυ[τῶν] πέντε ἄνδρας οἵτινες συντελοῦσιν τὰ ἐψηφισ- 
45 μένα ἤδη· οἵδε εἱρέθησαν, Ἐλπίνικος Μνησίππου, Λυκέας 
Ἱεροκλέου, Στρόμβιχος Κλεοδωρίδου, Θρασύμαχος Ἀντιμάχου, 
Λυσίθεος Διοκλέου. 
 
in corona 
[οἱ οἰ]κοῦντες 
τῶν πολιτῶν 
Ῥαμνοῦντι 
Δικαίαρχον. 
 
 Line 6: [β]ασιλέ[ως Δημητρίο]υ Rousell, but a new squeeze 
shows otherwise. See Pouilloux. 
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4. Honorary Decree for Herakleitos (c. 250) 
 
Maier, GMBI, n. 24. IG II
2
 1225; Dittenberger, Syll.
3
 454; Holleaux, Ét   s  ’é igra  i   t  ’ istoir  
grecques 1 (1938), 375 n. 26; Taylor 1997, pp. 250-256. Ed. Pr. Monceaux, Bulletin Héllenique 6 
(1882), 525. 
 
1 Χαιρέδημος Ἐπιχαρίνου Κολωνῆθεν εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ Ἡρά- 
κλειτος Ἀσκληπιάδου Ἀθμονεὺς πρότερόν τε παρὰ τῶι βα- 
σιλεῖ Ἀντιγό νωι τεταγμένος διετέλει λέγων καὶ πράττ- 
ων ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Σαλαμινίων ὅσα ὑπελάμβανεν συμ- 
5 φέρειν καὶ τοῖς ἰδίαι Σαλαμινίων ἀφικνουμένοις πρὸς τὸν 
βασιλέα συμφιλοτιμούμενο<ι>ς εἰς τὸ μηθενὸς τῶν δυνατῶ- 
[ν] ἀπράκτους γενομένους ἀπιέναι, καὶ νῦν καθεστηκὼς ὑπὸ τ- 
[ο]ῦ βασιλέως στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ Πε<ι>ραιέως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν 
ταττομένων μετὰ τοῦ Πειραιέως διατελεῖ πολλὴν πρόνοιαν 
10 ποιούμενος ὅπως ἂν μηθὲν ἀδίκημα γίνηται κατὰ τὴν χώρ- 
[α]ν, καὶ τῶν τειχῶν τῶν ἐν τῆι νήσωι πεπτωκότων συνεπεμε- 
[λ]ήθη ὅπως ἀνοικοδομηθεῖ, καὶ πολέμου γενομένου τοῦ περὶ Ἀ- 
λέξανδρον καὶ πειρατικῶν ἐκπλεόντων ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπιλιμνίου 
τὴν πᾶσαν πρόνοιαν ἐποεῖτο τοῦ μηθὲν βλαβερὸν γίνεσθαι π- 
15 ερὶ τὴν χώραν, ἀκολούθως τὴν τούτων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμεν- 
ος τῆι τοῦ βασιλέως πρὸς τὸν δῆμον αἱρέσει· ἔτι δὲ καὶ σώματ- 
ος ἁρπ[α]σθέντος ἐκ τῆς νήσου καὶ ἐξαχθέντος εἰς τοὺς ὑπεναντ- 
[ίου]ς ἀνέσ[ωι]σεν καὶ τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας ἐκόλασεν φανερ[ὸ]ν ποιῶν 
[ὅτι οὐ]κ ἐπιτρέψει τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν τὰ ἐν τῆι πόλει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῆι χώ- 
20 [ραι, π]αρέχεται δὲ καὶ κοινῆι καὶ ἰδίαι χρείαν τῶι βουλομένωι Σαλ- 
[αμι]ν[ίων κ]αὶ τἆλλα πράττων διατελεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα Σαλαμινί- 
[οις καὶ ἰδία]ι καὶ κοινεῖ · ἀγαθεῖ τύχει, δεδόχθαι τῶι δήμωι τῶι Σα[λ]- 
[αμινίων ἐπαινέσ]α[ι] Ἡρά[κλει]τον Ἀσκ[λη]π[ιά]δου Ἀθ[μ]ονέ[α — ] 
 
Line 17: ἁρπ[ασ]θέντος Kirchner. Line 18: ἀντέ[λυ]σεν Kirchner. Line 22:  
κα[ὶ] κοινεῖ Kirchner. 
 
 
5. Honorary Decree from Kleruchies on Salamis for Herakleitos 
 
IG II
2
 677. Dittenberger, Syll.
3
 401; Taylor 1997, pp. 250-256. Ed. Pr. Lolling, Archaiologikon 
Deltion (1889), 58. 
 
1 [— — — — — — — — — καὶ ἀνανεωσαμένου] τοῦ δήμ[ο]- 
[υ τὴ]ν θυσίαν καὶ τ[ὰ ἀγωνίσματα τῶν Πα]ναθηναίω- 
ν τό τε στάδιον κατ[εσκεύασεν ἐπαξί]ως καὶ ἀνατ- 
ίθησιν τῆι Ἀθηνᾶι τῆι [Νίκηι γραφ]ὰς ἐχούσας ὑπ- 
5 ομνήματα τῶν [τῶι βασιλεῖ] πεπραγμένων πρὸς το- 
ὺς βαρβάρους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἐλλήνων σωτηρίας.  
ὅπως ἂν οὖν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος φαίνηται διαφυλ- 
άττων [τοῖς εὐεργέταις] τὰς χάριτας, ἀγαθῆι τύ- 
χηι δεδόχθαι τῆι βουλῆι, ἐπαινέσαι μὲν Ἡράκλ- 
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10 ειτον Ἀσκληπιάδου Ἀθμονέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρ- 
υσῶι στεφάνωι εὐσεβείας ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς τοὺς θ- 
εοὺς καὶ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἧς ἔχων διατε- 
[λεῖ περί] τε [τὸν βασιλέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ] τὴμ βουλ- 
[ὴν καὶ τὸν] δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων· καὶ ἀναγορεῦσα- 
15 [ι τοῦτον τὸν στέ]φανον ἐν τῶι γυμνικῶι ἀγῶνι [τὸ]- 
[ν ἀγωνοθέτην κατὰ τὸ]ν νόμον· ἐπιμεληθῆναι δὲ 
[τῆς ποήσεως τοῦ στεφάνου τὸν ἐπὶ] τῆς διοικήσε- 
[ως· ὅπως ἂν οὖν αὐτῶι ὑπόμνημα ὑπάρ]χηι τῆς φιλο- 
[τιμίας, τὸν γραμματέα τὸν κατὰ πρυταν]είαν ἀνα- 
20 [γράψαι τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα ἐν στήληι· εἰς δὲ τ]ὴν στ- 
[ήλην μερίσαι τὸν ἐπὶ τῆι διοικήσει τὸ γενόμε]ν- 
[ον ἀνάλωμα]. 
 
 
6. Decree from Philippoi (243) 
 
Hatzopoulos, Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 36; Rigsby, Asylia, n. 27; Hatzopoulos 1993, pp. 575-84. 
Ed. Pr. R. Herzog-G. Klaffenbach, Asylieurkunden aus Kos (Berlin 1952) 15-18, n. 6. 
 
1              Φιλίππων. 
ἱερῶν· ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκ Κῶ θεωρίας. γνώμη τῆς ἐκλησίας· ἐπειδὴ ἡ πόλις ἡ Κώιων κατὰ 
τὰ πάτρια καὶ κατὰ τὴμ μαντείαν τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ἀπέσταλκεν ἀρχι- 
θέωρον Ἀριστόλοχον Ζμένδρωνος καὶ θεωρὸν μετ’ αὐτοῦ Μακαρέα Ἀράτου 
5 ἐπαγγέλλοντας τήν τε θυσίαν τῶι Ἀσκληπιῶι καὶ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, οἵτινες ἐπελ- 
θόντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκλησίαν τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῆι πόλει τῆι Κώιων 
πρὸς τὴμ πόλιν τὴν Φιλίππων καὶ πρὸς τὸμ βασιλέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλ- 
λους Ἕλληνας καὶ Μακεδόνας ἐνεφάν[ι]σαν καὶ ἀνενεώσαντο, ἠξίουν δὲ 
τὸ ἱερὸν ἄσυλον εἶναι, ἀγαθῆι τύχηι δεδόχθαι τῆι ἐκλησίαι δέχεσθαι τὴμ πόλιν 
10 τήν τε ἐπαγγελίαν τὴν τῶν Ἀσκληπιείων τῶν ἐν Κῶι καὶ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, κα- 
θάπερ ἐπαγγέλλουσιν οἱ θεωρ[οί], ἐπαινέσαι <δ>ὲ καὶ τὴμ πόλιν τὴν Κώιων ἐπὶ ταῖς 
τιμαῖς αἷς συντελεῖ τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆι εὐνοίαι τῆι τε πρὸς τὸμ βασιλέα Ἀντί- 
γονον καὶ τὴμ πόλιν τὴν Φιλίππων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας καὶ Μακεδόνας, δοῦ- 
ναι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ τὸ ἐν Κῶι ἄσυλον, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγο- 
15 νος προαιρεῖται, δοῦναι δὲ τὸν ταμίαν τοῖς θεωροῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εἰς ξένια 
ὅσον καὶ τοῖς τὰ Πύθια ἐπαγγέλλουσιν δίδοται ἐν τῶι νόμωι γέγραπται, καλέσαι δὲ 
τοὺς θεωροὺς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως τὸν ἄρχοντα εἰς τὸ πρυτανεῖον· τὸν 
δὲ ταμίαν δοῦναι τῶι ἄρχοντι ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν ἀργύριον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου· ὅπως 
δ’ ἂν ἀσφαλῶς ἀποσταλῶσιν εἰς Νέαν Πόλιν, τοὺς στρατηγοὺς συμπέμψαι αὐτοῖς 
20 τοὺς ξένους <σ>τρατιώτας τοὺς παρὰ τῆι πόλει μισθοφοροῦντας· εἶναι δὲ καὶ 
θεωροδόκον. 
[τ]ῆς ἐκ Κῶ παραγινομένης θεωρίας τὸν ὑποδεδεγμένον τὴν θεωρίαν Ἡρακλεόδωρον 
Ἀριστίωνο[ς]. 
 
Lines 13-4: Rigsby and the original editors restore <εἶ>|ναι, but Hatzopoulous believes 
δίδωμι is correct on the basis of its alternative eaning of “concede.” 
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7. Decree from Kassandreia (276-240) 
 
Hatzopoulos, Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 46. Hatzopoulos, Poikilia (Meletemata X (Athens 1990) 
136-54). Ed. Pr. Pazaras, Πρακτικὰ τοῦ πρώτου Πανελληνίου Συμποσίου ἱστορίας καὶ ἁρχαιολογίας 
τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς 1984 (Thessalonika 1987) 178, n. 38. 
 
1 ἐφ’ ἱερέως Ἀντιλέ- 
οντος, Ὑπερβερετα[ί]- 
ου πένπτηι ἐπὶ δ[έ]- 
κα, οἱ στρατηγοὶ εἶπα[ν]· 
5 ἐπειδὴ Δωρόθεος Δώ- 
[ρ]ου Σελευκεὺς ἀνὴρ ἀ- 
γαθὸς ὢν διατελεῖ π[ε]- 
ρὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν Κα[σ]- 
σανδρέων καὶ τεταγ[μέ]- 
10 [ν]ος παρὰ τῆι βασιλίσσ[ηι] 
[Φίλα]ι τοῖς ἀφικνουμ[έ]- 
[νοις] Κασσανδρέω[ν] 
[π]ρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ἰδίαι [καὶ] 
[κοι]νῆι προθύμως ἑα[υ]- 
15 [τὸν] παρέχεται, [ἒδο]- 
[ξε] τῆι βουλῆ[ι] 
[-------------------------] 
  
 Line 11: [αἰε]ὶ Pazara. Line 16-17: [δε]|[δόχθα]ι Hatzopoulos. 
 
8. Decree of Kassandreia (243): found on same stone as n. 6 above. 
Hatzopoulos, Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 47. SEG 12.373. Ed. Pr. R. Herzog-G. Klaffenbach, 
Asylieurkunden aus Kos (Berlin 1952) 15-18, n. 6. 
   
1      Κασσανδρέων. 
οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ νομοφύλακες εἶπαν· ἐπειδ<δ>ὴ παραγεγένηνται θεωροὶ πα- 
ρὰ τῆς Κώιων πόλεως ἐπαγγέλλοντες τὰ Ἀσκληπίεια καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας 
τοὺς συντελουμένους ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ ἀπολογίζονται τὴν 
5 εὔνοιαν τῆς αὑτῶν πόλεως, ἣν ἔχουσα διατελεῖ πρός τε τὸμ βασιλέα Ἀν- 
τίγονον καὶ τὴν Κασσανδρέων πόλιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς Μακεδόνας 
πάντας, καὶ ἀξιοῦσιν τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἄσυλον εἶναι, 
ἀγαθῆι τύχηι δεδόχθαι τῆι βουλῆι δέχεσθαι τὴν ἐπανγελίαν τῶν Ἀσ- 
κληπιείων καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπι- 
10 οῦ ἄσυλον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως βούλησιν, ἐπαινέσαι δὲ τὴμ πόλιν τῶν Κώιων, 
διότι διατελεῖ πρόνοιαν ποιουμένη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συντελουμένων 
καλῶς καὶ ἐνδόξως καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῆι εὔνοιαν διαφυλάσσει 
πρός τε τὸμ βασιλέα Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν καὶ Μακεδόνας πάν- 
τας, δοῦναι δὲ τὸν ταμίαν τοῖς παραγεγενημένοις ξένιον τὸ διάταγμα τὸ 
15 ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, καλέσαι δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀρχηγέτειον, τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα 
τὸ εἰς ταῦτα δοῦναι τὸν ταμίαν. οἵδε ἐπήγγειλαν· Ἀριστόλοχος Ζμένδρω- 
νος ἀρχιθέωρος, Μακαρεὺς Ἀράτου θεωρός. ἡ θυσία εἰς ἐνάτην σελήνην. 
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9. Decree from Moryllos (208/7) 
Hatzopoulos, Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 53. G. Marasco, Epigraphica 53 (1991), 290-91; Gauthier, 
BE (1993), 366. Ed. Pr.M.B. Hatzopoulos-Louisa D. Loukopoulou. 1985. Morrylos, cité de la 
Crestonie. Meletemata 7: 17-40. 
 
1 [Ε]ὔξενος Σάμου, Μένανδρος Ὁλωίχου, 
Νικάνωρ Παραμόνου, οἱ ἄρχοντες εἶπα[ν]· 
ἐ πεὶ Παράμονος Σαμαγόρου ἐπὶ τῆς 
Δημητρίου τοῦ Σωπάτρου στρατηγίας 
5 ἐπελθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐδεδώκει τῆι πόλ [ει] 
ὥς τε τ{ετ}ε ῶι Ἀσκληπιῶι βοῦν ἀγελαίαν, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἐκ 
γενομένης ἐπιγονῆς πλείονος ἐν τῶι πέντε 
[κ]αὶ δεκάτωι ἔτει, <ἐπὶ> τῆς Ἐπινίκου στρατηγίας, δο- 
[χ]θέντος τῆι πόλει στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν θαλ- 
10 λίνωι στεφάνωι, τοὺς τότε ἄρχοντας μὴ ἀναδεδω - 
κέναι τὸ ψήφισμα διὰ τῶν ἰδίων γραμ<μ>άτων , 
[δ]εδόχθαι τῆι Μορρυλίων πόλει, ἐπεὶ πολιτε[ύ]- 
[ε]ται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμεμψιμοιρήτως, ἐπιδι - 
[δ]οὺς αὑτὸν ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς κατὰ κοινὸν συ [μ]- 
15 [φ]έρουσιν, ἐπαινέσαι τε αὐτὸν καὶ στεφαν [ῶ]- 
[σ]αι θαλλίνωι στεφάνωι, σταθῆναι δὲ τὴν 
[σ]τήλην δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῶι ἐπιφανεστάτωι 
[τ]όπωι τοῦ Ἀσκληπιείου, ὅπως καὶ ο[ἱ] λ οι ποὶ 
[τ]ῶν πολιτῶν ἐνβλέποντες ὡς ἀπονέ- 
20 μεταί τις χάρις τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδράσ[ι]ν 
παρορμῶσιν πρὸς τὴν ὁμοίαν αἵρε[σ]ιν, ἀπο- 
σταλῆι δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα ε[ἰ]ς τὸν μνήμονα. 
vacat ἐπεχειροτονήθη Ὑπερβερεταίου ιζʹ. 
 
 Line 8: ἐπὶ Gauthier. 
 
 
10. Fragmentary decree concerning Olympichos of Caria 
 
Ed. Pr. Crampa, I Labraunda, n. 9. 
 
1 [—]κου ὄντος δὲ βουλῆι 
[— Πα]ν ήμου προτέραι γνώ- 
[μη — ἱερέως Δι]ὸς Ὀσ[ο]γ ω· ἐπειδὲ Ὀλυμ - 
[πιχος — τοῦ βασιλέ]ως Σελεύκου στρα- 
5 [τηγὸς —αιρ]έ σεως καὶ τῶν π ρογό - 
[νων — πολλῶν καὶ μεγά]λ ων  ἀγαθ [ῶν ․c.6․․] 
[—]ουτ [․․c.7․․] 
[—]λ ευ[․․c.8․․․] 
[—]vacat[—] 
10 [—]ερ․[․․․c.9․․․] 
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11. Honorary decree mentioning Olympichos as strategos 
Ed. Pr. Laumonier, BCH 58 (1934), 291-298, n. 1. 
 
a.1 [ἐπ]ειδὴ Διο[νυτᾶς καὶ Ἀπολλᾶς — δια]τρίβοντες 
[π]αρ’ Ὀλυμπίχωι τῶι στρατηγῶι ἐν τῶι ἐπιστωλαγραφίωι πολλοῖς τῶν 
πολιτῶν χρείας παρείσχηται καὶ κοινῆι καὶ ἰδίαι μετὰ πάσης εὐνοί- 
ας, πρόθυμοί τέ εἰσιν εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ συμφέροντα· δεδόχθαι τῆι βουλῆι 
5 καὶ τῶι δήμωι δεδόσθαι Διονυτᾶι καὶ Ἀπολλᾶι πολιτείαν καὶ ἔνκτησιν 
καὶ μετουσίαν πάντων καθ’ ἃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὑπάρχει· τάδε 
[α]ὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ τ[οῖς ἐκγ]όνοις αὐτῶν· ἐπικληρῶσαι δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰς 
[φυ]λὴν καὶ συνγ[ένειαν· ἔ]δοξε τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι συντελεῖσ- 
[θαι] καθ’ ὅτι π[ρογέγραπται· ἔ]λαχεν φυλῆς Ἐρεχθηΐδος. 
b.1 καὶ ἀναγράψαι τὸ ψήφισ[μα —· ἑλέσ]- 
θαι δὲ καὶ πρεσβευ[τὰς οἳ — ἀποδώ]- 
σουσιν αὐτῶι καὶ [—] 
προγεγενημέν[α φιλάνθρωπα —] 
5 ἔδοξε τῆι βου[λῆι καὶ τῶι δήνωι συντελεῖσθαι καθ’ ὅτι προγέγραπται] 
 
 
12. Section of a fragmentary decree of Rhodes requesting help against Olympichos 
(220/13) 
Blümel, Iasos, n. 150. Ed. Pr. Philippe Le Bas- William Waddington. Inscriptions Grecques Et 
Latines Recueillies En Asie Mineure (1972), n. 251. 
 
[ἔδοξεν τᾶι βουλᾶι καὶ τῶι δ]άμωι· ἐπειδὴ Ἰασέων [σ]υ[νγ]ενῶν καὶ φίλ[ων] 
40 [ὑπαρχόντων τοῦ δάμου καὶ ἀ]ποστειλ[άντ]ων ψάφισμα καὶ πρεσβε[ί]αν [π]ο[τὶ] 
[τὰν πόλιν τὰν ἐμφανιοῦσαν] τὰ γεγ [ενη]μένα ἀδικήματα εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀγ[—] 
[— ὑ]πὸ Ὀλυμπίχο<υ> καὶ παρακ[αλεσάν]των τὸ[ν δᾶ]- 
[μον πρόνοιαν ποιήσασθαι τ]ᾶς πόλιος αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι πρὸς 
[Ὀλύμπιχον πρεσβευτὰς τοὺ]ς ἀπολ[ο]γισουμένους περὶ [τ]ῶν [—] 
45 [— διαφυλάξαι] αὐτοῖς τὰν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν [καὶ] 
[αὐτόνομον — πρ]οα[ί]ρεσι<ν> καὶ [—]τ[—] 
[—] Ἰασέων τοῦ λ[—] 
[— πα]ρακαλέσ[αι αὐτὸν —] 
[—]γ[—]κ[—]ι[—] 
50 [— ἐλευθέ]ρα<ν> καὶ α[ὐτ]όνο<μ>[ον —] 
[— τ]ὰ ἀξιούμενα καὶ [—] 
[—]ος εὐχαριστούντω[ν —] 
[—] τῶν γεγε[νημένων —] 
[—]ων[—]κα[—] 
55 [— δ]ιαγνον[τ—]συν[—] 
[—]εγον[—]μα[—] 
[—]ελ[—]ασ[—] 
[—]ον[—] 
[—]λιπ[—] 
60 [—]ραν αὐτω[—] 
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[—] καὶ δ[—] 
[—]να[ι]ς [κ]αὶ ἐν πε[—] 
[—] καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ [—] 
[—]αι[—] 
65 [— με]θ όριοι [—] 
[—]ντα[—] 
[—]ι[—] 
[—]ι[—] 
[—]ια[—] 
70 [—] 
[—] 
[—]οντ[—]αν[—] 
[—] τ ῶι [δ]άμ[ωι, ἐπιδε]ί[ξ]α[ν]τες τὰ ἐπεσ[ταλμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ποτὶ] 
[τὰ]ν πόλιν, [π]αρακαλ[έσοντι] αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν ὑπάρχο[ντα στραταγὸν μὴ ἐπι]- 
75 [τρ]έπειν τοῖς ὑφ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένοις μηθὲν ἀδίκημα [ποεῖσθαι ἐν τᾶι χώ]- 
[ραι] τᾶι Ἰασέων, ἀλλὰ ποτιφέρεσθαι αὐτοῖς φιλανθρώπως, καὶ ἐ[πὶ τῶν γε]- 
[γ]ενημένων ἀδικημάτων πρόνοιάν τινα ποιήσασθαι ὅπω[ς γένη]- 
[τ]αι τὰ δίκαια ἀκολούθως τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπισταλεῖσ[ιν, εἰδό]- 
[τ]α ὅτι τούτων ἐπιμεληθεὶς ὁμολογούμενα φανεῖται πράσσων [τᾶι] 
80 [τ]ε τοῦ βασιλέως αἱρέσει καὶ τοῖς ἐπιστελλομένοις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ φι[λαν]- 
[θ]ρώποις ποτὶ τὰν πόλιν· ἐμφανιζόντων δὲ αὐτῶι τοὶ πρεσβευ[ταὶ] 
[ὅ]τι ὁ δᾶμος εἰδὼς Ἰασεῖς εὔνους ὑπάρχοντας τᾶι πόλει καὶ προα[ιρού]- 
μενος αὐτοῖς συγκατασκευάζειν πάντα τὰ πὸτ ἀσφάλειαν [καὶ] 
σωτηρίαν, πρότερόν τε ἐτύγχανε δεδωκὼς ποτίταγμα τοῖ[ς] 
85 ἄρχουσι τοῖς ἀποστελλομένοις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τᾶς Ἰασ[έων] 
χώρας καθάπερ καὶ τᾶς τοῦ δάμου, καὶ νῦν μναμονεύων τᾶς ὑπ[αρ]- 
χούσας πὸτ αὐτοὺς οἰκειότατος οὐθενὸς ἀποσ[τα]σεῖται τῶν συ[μφε]- 
ρόντων Ἰασεῦσι· εἰ δέ κα τοῦ δάμου πᾶσαν σπουδὰν ποιουμένου [περὶ] 
τούτων μηδεμίαν ἐπιστροφὰν Ὀλύμπιχος ποιῆται ἀλλὰ περ[ιο]- 
90 ρῇ τὰ γινόμενα ἀδικήματα, δηλούντω<ν> αὐτῶι τοὶ πρεσβευταὶ ὅτι 
τὰμ μὲν φιλίαν καὶ τὰν εὔνοιαν τὰν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶι ποτὶ βασιλ[έα] 
Φίλιππον διαφυλαξεῖ ὁ δᾶμος, πραξεῖ δὲ ἃ πέπεισται συμφέροντα 
εἴμειν ποτὶ τὰν Ἰασέων ἀσφάλειαν· ἁιρέθεν vacat Τιμασίθεος 
Διονυσίου, vacat Ἐπικράτης Τιμασιστράτου. 
 
 
 
13. Honorary Decree for Asklepiades 
 
Salin, I Stratonikeia, n. 4. Ed. Pr. Cousin, BCH 28 (1904), 346-348, n. 2-3. 
 
1 βασιλεύοντος Φιλίππου, 
ἔτους τρίτου καὶ εἰκοστο[ῦ,] 
Ξανδικοῦ ἑβδόμῃ, ἐπὶ σ[τεφα]- 
νηφόρου Ἀπόλλωνος [τὸ τρί]- 
5 τον, ἐκλησίας κυ[ρίας γενο]- 
μένης· ἔδοξε [Παναμαρέ]- 
ων τῶι κοινῶι· [ἐπειδὴ Ἀσκλη]- 
πιάδης Ἀσ[κληπιάδου  Πευ]- 
μάτιος [ἀποσταλεὶς ἐπι]- 
10 στάτ[ης ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως] 
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Φιλί[ππου τῆς τε φυλακῆς] 
τοῦ [χωρίου καλῶς προέσ]- 
τ[η καὶ συμφερόντως ὑπέρ τε] 
[τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐμ πᾶ]σι [τοῖς και]- 
15 [ροῖς καλῶς] φροντίζων [δια]- 
[τετέλεκ]εν, καὶ συνσεισθέ[ν]- 
των τῶν τειχέων ὑπὸ τοῦ 
σεισμοῦ, ἐκτενῆ παρέχων αὑ- 
τόν, ἐπεσκεύασεν πάντα, 
20 ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλαν- 
θρώπως κέχρηται καὶ κοι- 
νῇ πᾶσιν καὶ ἰδίαι ἑκάστωι, 
ἀκόλουθα πράσσων τῆι προ- 
αιρέσει τοῦ βασιλέως Φι- 
25 λίππου· ὅπως οὖν καὶ Πανα- 
μαρεῖς φαίνωνται τιμῶν- 
τες τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας· 
ἀγαθῆι τύχηι, δεδόχθαι 
τῶι κοινῶι· πρῶτον μὲν βα- 
30 [σιλέα Φίλιππον] ἐπα [ινέσαι] 
[---------------------------------] 
 
 
14. Honorary Decree for Apollonius (200-190) 
 
Segre.“Tituli Caly nii.” In AS Atene 22-23 (1944-1945 [1952]) 25-26, n. 23. Wörrle, Chiron 18 
(1988), 432-37; SEG 2.536. Ed. Pr. Persson, BCH 46 (1922) 395, n. 1. 
 
1 [ἐπὶ στεφανηφό]ρου θεοῦ [Ἀπόλλωνος] 
[τοῦ] τρ[ί]τοῦ μετὰ Δημήτριον Ἀπολλωνί[ου] 
[μη]νὸς Ἀρτεμισιῶνος ἕκτῃ, πρυτάνε- 
[ων] γνώμη· ἐπειδὴ Ἀπολλώνιος καὶ Φίλιππο[ς] 
5 Ἀπολλωνίου [Κα]λύμνι[ο]ι τεταγμέν[οι] ἐ[πι]- 
[στά]τα[ι] ἀεὶ ἐμ παν[τὶ κ]αιρῶι διατε[λ]οῦσ[ιν] 
τὴν εὔν[ο]ιαν πα[ρεχ]όμε[νοι] τῶι [τ]ε βασιλεῖ 
[κα]ὶ τοῖς πολίτ[αις, δεδόχθαι] τῆ[ι βου]λ[ῆι καὶ] 
9 τῶι δήμωι … 
 
 Line 1-2: θεοδ[ώρου τοῦ δεῖνος | τοῦ] τρ[ί]του Persson. 
 Lines 9-11: Persson has further restorations, but the stone 
 is severely fragmentary here.
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